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The civil war in Syria has displaced 11 million people worldwide since its breakout in                             
2011. Four million of these have dispersed through six continents as refugees, with                         
approximately 100 countries becoming their hosts (UNHCR, 2014a). Three neighboring                   
countries of Syria ­ Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey ­ have taken the lead in the number of Syrian                                   
refugees hosted during the war. This thesis focuses on Turkey, a country that has been directly                               
shaken by the war in Syria. Turkey had traditionally been a transit country for migrants, refugees                               
and asylees attempting to move to Europe via Greece. The Syrian crisis has become the push                               
factor to shift the country’s position from a historical transit base, into a refugee haven. Its                               
geographical location, multiethnic cities and a welcoming national discourse adopted by the                       
government towards Syrian refugees has made Turkey a popular destination for those seeking                         
safety. Over two million Syrian refugees have arrived in Turkey since 2011, making it the host to                                 
the largest refugee population in the world (UNHCR, 2014b).  
The Syrian refugee context in Turkey is a multi­faceted issue marked with contradictions.                         
The tension between the Turkish past as a Muslim empire, and Turkish present as a ​laic                               1
nation­state comes to the fore in Turkish refugee policy. The government’s rhetoric towards                         
Syrians arriving at the Turkish border during the Syrian war has been highly Islamicized, with                             











under a Sunni Muslim state, and with cultural notions of hospitality. The founder of Turkey’s                             
ruling Islamist party ​Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi , the AKP, and incumbent president Recep                         2
Tayyip Erdogan has often referred to Syrian refugees as ‘Muslim brother’ (Arutz Sheva, 2015).                           
According to Erdogan and his party, it is a religious duty inherited from the Ottoman past to                                 
make the ‘brother’ comfortable during the period of his guesthood. Romanticization of the                         
Ottoman era is not peculiar to the ruling party officials in Turkey. It has, in fact, become a                                   
rhetorical practice for the Islamists in the country to glorify the Ottoman Empire; life in a Sunni                                 
Muslim state, where not nation but religion defined the citizen.  
The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 upon different values than those of the                             
Ottoman Empire, with the biggest shift being secular nationalism taking the place of religion as                             
the underlying foundation of the state. The country of Turks was now a nation­state, and a laic                                 
democracy which pushed Islam into the private sphere. Under the pro­Westernization founders,                       
Turkey experienced a construction of a new political identity free from religion. However, it was                             
a struggle for this new identity to be accepted by all citizens. The Islamists and Kurds protested,                                 
and the state, in return, denounced them as the enemy. The Turkish Islamists were considered a                               
danger for the country’s laicist future, and the Kurds a threat to the homogenous unification of                               
the ethnic Turkish nation.  
The year 2002 signified a major shift in Turkey’s political history, declaring the success                           
of the Islamist AKP in the elections and switching the political power­holder in the country from                               
laicists to Islamists. With the AKP’s rule, the manifestation of Muslim identity has reached its                             










between a Muslim and a Turk has been highly promoted by the AKP, especially by its founder                                 
Erdogan who has many times voiced his dedication to raise a religious youth (NTV, 2012).                             
Government officials have openly identified themselves as pious Muslims, explicitly                   
distinguishing themselves from the laicists while revealing strong ties back to the wider ​umma​.                           3
Such an open declaration of religious identity represented at the government level has generated                           
serious concerns among laicists in Turkey over the comeback of Ottoman state tradition and                           
sharia law. Speculations over the AKP’s loyalty to the 92 year­old laicist nation­state rule have                             
remained ever­since.  
The Syrian refugee crisis that began as the Islamist ruling party was growing in strength                             
with each election has raised many questions: Could the success of the Islamists mean a                             
comeback of the Ottoman traditions that the Islamists in Turkey have always idolized? Does the                             
government and the Islamists in the country in general see the Syrian refugee crisis as an                               
opportunity to transform the state tradition? Is the 92­year old laic nation­state tradition declining                           
in conjunction with the arrival of 2.2 million Syrians, most of whom are Sunni Muslims? This                               
thesis argues that the Syrian crisis, and the government’s response to it bring these questions                             
about Turkish national identity to the foreground of sociopolitical discourse. The Islamist party’s                         
practice of shaping the state’s refugee response in Ottoman­style politics may reveal a crack in                             
their investment to the laic nation­state tradition. However, the Islamist sense of Ottomanism                         
would require the local integration of Syrians, and superiority of in the eyes of the polity                               
(McCarthy, 1997: 128). The current Islamist government has put for only temporary measures to                           










fold. While the Islamic rhetoric of the government promised the best for the ‘brother’, the                             
practice has appeared to be in favor of the ‘his’ return.  
Turkish engagement with the crisis initiated with building state­of­the­art refugee camps.                     
Turkey was praised for realizing an ideal by the ​New York Times which published an article titled                                 
‘How to Build a Perfect Refugee Camp’ praising Turkey (New York Times, 2014). Syrians have                             
also been allowed to settle freely in urban areas; in fact, 90% of them have chosen                               
self­settlement over these ‘perfect’ camps (Al Jazeera Turk, 2015a). Increasing self­settlement,                     
has generated further problems such as the Syrian expansion in the informal economy, where the                             
employee rights of the refugee are often violated. Syrians’ rejection of settling in the camps has                               
also brought about changes in local host attitudes. In this context, an anti­refugee climate has                             
been born.  
This thesis finds that such a turn of events is deeply­rooted in Turkish attempts to locate                               
the larger issue of hosting refugees into cultural notions of ‘guesthood’ rather than a developed                             
refugee rights framework. The 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of                         
Refugees defines the refugee as a person who "owing to a well­founded fear of being persecuted                               
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political                           
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is                                   
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (UNHCR, 2010). However, due to a                               
geographical limitation set forth in the Convention, Turkey only grants the refugee status, and                           
the rights that come along with it, to those fleeing persecution in Europe. The limitation requires                               
that other persons with legitimate claims for refugee status are transferred to the United Nations                             









non­European origin, Syrians fall under the legal category of those under temporary protection,                         
formally referred to as ‘guests’ or ‘asylees’ under Turkish law.  
The cultural norm of guesthood is an extremely valued concept in Islam , but something                           4
that remains insufficient as a political response to a major refugee crisis. Islamic ideology                           
requires welcoming the guest unconditionally (El­Abed, 2014: 86); Turkish Islamists explicitly                     
reference this injunction in their public discourse. Double imperative of hospitality, on the other                           
hand, is often neglected. The expression of hospitality is made possible through one side’s                           
superiority that comes as a result of “ownership of place” (Brun, 2010: 347). The ethical form of                                 
hospitality, however, is challenged in the presence of a threat to the superior’s control over its                               
territory (El­Abed, 2014: 86).  
Permanent stay, or owning property, is not expected of a guest. The protracted nature of                             
the Syrian refugee crisis has indicated to the limits of the applicability of notions of hospitality in                                 
an international refugee situation. As refugees have dispersed all over Turkey, they have become                           
more visible. Refugee rejection of camps has remained incomprehensible for many Turks that                         
expected Syrians to behave as guests and to stay in camps, where shelter had been provisioned.                               
Self­settlement has been considered a betrayal to many with contradicting expectations of                       
guesthood rather than understood within a framework of refugee rights. Why were ‘the guests’                           
















The government itself has perpetuated such notions of guesthood with its policies. The                         
Islamist government has based its rhetoric for welcoming the refugees on the Ottoman past, but                             
has not fully implemented an Ottoman vision in its refugee policy; as the state neither integrated                               
Syrians into the polity, nor granted them a privileged position in society for being Muslim. While                               
failing to enact on Ottoman mold, the government has also not lived up to modern democratic                               
ideals, by failing to institutionalize international refugee law. By locating refugee rights within                         
notions of guesthood, the government denies refugees an opportunity for full local integration                         
with concomitant links to establishing self­sustaining households. Lack of government oversight                     
and regulation has increased local hostility toward Syrian refugees, severely undermining the                       
guest model. 
The Syrian refugee situation in Turkey is fraught with policy ambiguities, while durable                         
solutions remain elusive. Refugees’ ties to Turkey are interrupted, because their stay is                         
time­restricted. Strict laws towards the newcomers of the country render the establishment of                         
permanent residence nearly impossible. The ​de facto ​strategy of the government in its response                           
to the crisis has been building refugee camps. This thesis problematizes the notion of a camp that                                 
is increasingly referred to as ‘warehousing’ (Smith, 2004). Both the UNHCR, and refugee                         
hosting governments have for a long time favored the camp model to respond to refugee crises.                               
Camps are characterized by the separation of refugees from locals, government control, and                         
easier coordination of relief activities often in a secluded territory. For decades, camps have been                             
the most commonly­used formal strategy for hosting refugees. Although warehousing refugees in                       










Karen Jacobsen has found that camps are favored, because they prevent refugees from                         
enjoying the rights they would not enjoy in their country of origin (Jacobsen, 2002: 111).                             
Refugee camps, therefore, have been viewed as eliminating the obstacles to return of refugees                           
back to their home countries. Camps have also been seen as saving the government from                             
skyrocketing spending while helping refugees retain their own traditions (Kibreab, 1989: 470).                       
As central as camps have been to refugee policies, restricted movement and exclusion from                           
economic and personal independence have rendered these areas in the periphery non­habitable.                       
As a result, some two thirds of the world’s refugees have chosen self­settlement, mostly in the                               
urban areas (UNHCR, 2015a).  
Referred to as urban refugees, refugee self­settlers challenge the traditional construction                     
of a nation­state. The nation­state legitimizes the construction of an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’,                           
the former being a member of the body politic, while the latter does not have member status or                                   
the rights that go with it. As a group having different historical and cultural values, urban                               
refugees bring heterogeneity into the country, contradicting with the nation­state ideal of a                         
homogenous unification within the claimed territory. The isolating nature of the refugee camps,                         
on the other hand, ensures the continued purity of the state. The camp model suggests that what                                 
is expected of a refugee is to passively wait in the periphery until conditions improve in the                                 
country of origin and repatriation begins. These expectations are interlinked to the nation­state                         
construction of the immobility of identity (Malkki, 1992: 29). Refugees are considered to have                           










This thesis is based on field research conducted in the summer of 2015 in southeastern                             
Turkey. With electricity, hot water, playgrounds, schools and job training courses provided in the                           
camps, the government of Turkey has undoubtedly built exceptional camp infrastructure. Almost                       
all of the Syrian refugee participants in this study compared Turkey with Lebanon, Egypt and                             
Jordan and expressed their gratitude for Turkish efforts. The findings of the fieldwork illustrate,                           
however, that the quality of camps does not make the conditions of encampment more attractive                             
for the refugee. The services provided in camps have not changed the constraining nature of a                               
refugee camp, or concealed the effort of the Turkish nation­state to keep the city ‘sterile’. With                               
obscure policies, and transient approaches to the Syrian refugee issue like building refugee                         
camps, the government of Turkey has indicated that it is reluctant to allow refugees to integrate                               
within the country. Enhancing the quality of camps while failing to improve quality of life for                               
urban refugees indicates that Turkey ­ despite being hailed as a model for refugee reception ­                               
exhibits characteristic of a failed host policy. This thesis refers to these characteristics as the                             
international refugee host complex​, which will be explained in detail in Part II.  
There is growing evidence that Turkey’s refugee policy is inadequate. The life of                         
refugees living in urban or semi­urban areas is extremely difficult. Out of the 20 interviewed                             
Syrian refugees for this study, almost all indicated a contrast between past and present, referring                             
to the past in Syria as ‘normal’ while characterizing the present in Turkey as ‘abnormal’. UN                               
reports have illustrated the will of a considerable number of refugees to depart from Turkey in                               
life­jeopardizing ways, showing the desperation that refugees in Turkey feel. The number of                         













This thesis is based on field research conducted in the summer of 2015 in southeastern                             
Turkey. The field research location was chosen due to the significant number of refugees hosted                             
in the area. A total of 20 interviews were conducted with self­settled Syrian refugees with the                               
assistance of an Arabic interpreter. Throughout the process, the research relied primarily on                         6
qualitative methods using a semi­structured interview techniques. Questions asked during the                     
interviews included: ‘Can you define difficulties of life in a non­camp setting?’, ‘Have you had                             
access to aid coming from national or international resources?’, ‘Why have you chosen                         
self­settlement over camps?’, ‘How has your overall experience been with the host community?’,                         
and ‘Have you suffered from prejudice or acts of aggression?’ along with unstructured interview                           
interactions. In addition to the interviews with Syrians, ethnographic observations of the locals in                           
southeastern Turkey were recorded through note­taking. An online survey was also conducted                       
with Turkish citizens via SurveyMonkey, through which 164 responses were collected. The                       
questions in the matrix­question­survey included the age and sex of the participant, their                         
location, concerns about having Syrians in Turkey, security issues with the presence of Syrians,                           











This thesis contextualizes the Syrian refugee issue in Turkey, and aims to provide a                             
deeper understanding of the underlying motives behind the national rhetoric and practice adopted                         
towards the country’s new demographic. The research question it addresses is stated as ‘​How                           
does the Syrian refugee crisis intersect with competing formulations of Turkish politics and                         
national identity?’ 
Part II will address the literature on major concepts this thesis problematizes: the                         
nation­state and the refugee camp. A comparison of refugee situations throughout the world has                           
also taken place in order to better locate Turkey in the worldwide discussion of refugee and host                                 
community relations. The patterns ­ mostly signifying a set of failures ­ found in the acts of                                 
major refugee hosts in the world which entails patterns of exclusion, abuse and false assumptions                             
will be investigated. Part III will cover the history of Turks ­ which includes the country’s deeper                                 
connection to Syrians. The section will also study the data obtained from the fieldwork to                             
provide the context of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Part IV includes conclusion remarks,                         





















This section will review the literature surrounding three main subjects: the nation­state,                       
international refugee host complex, and refugee camps. The question of how these three are                           
interlinked, and their significance will be addressed.  
Turkish engagement with the 2.2 million Syrian refugee population should be evaluated                       
under two areas ­ rhetoric and practice ­ and in two different time periods ­ the beginning and                                   
later days of the crisis. The government’s rhetoric towards Syrians arriving at the Turkish                           
borders during the war has been highly Islamicized, with references to the Ottoman era and                             
cultural notions of hospitality. The government’s strong Islamic rhetoric and concerns over how                         
the Syrian refugee population may be used as a political tool have heightened tensions among                             
Turks. A year­long study of the media coverage of the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey has found                                 
that the newspaper representing the view of the laicists, the ​Cumhuriyet, ​criticized the                         
government for its Syrian refugee policy:  
The general attitude of Cumhuriyet newspaper is to criticize the government over                       
Syrians. The common concern of Turkish public on Syrians such as ‘they are becoming                           
Turkish citizens’; ‘they will be able to vote in elections’; ‘they are allowed to establish                             
private enterprises’; were reported as problematic issues and the government is blamed                       
for opening the doors to Syrians (Karakus and Yaylaci, 2015: 244). 
 
Despite these concerns over ​de facto integration of Syrian refugees, government policy is                         
in fact oriented toward exclusion, through both camp segregation and urban marginalization.                       
Today, 90% of Turkey’s Syrian refugees live in urban and semi­urban areas. Urban refugee                           









regulation in the city has caused numerous problems both for Syrians themselves and for the                             
local community. Begging as a strategy of survival has increased among Syrians; though rare,                           
some Syrians have taken part in cases of burglary and stealing (Cumhuriyet, 2015). Such events                             
have led to hostility and a negative representation of the Syrian population for many members of                               
the local community. A major shift in public discourse on Syrians is now apparent: from                             
empathy into resentment. Such a change of attitude in the Turkish community translates to a                             
strong division between the early and later days of the crisis, the former referring to a relatively                                 
stable environment, and the latter to increasing unrest.  
Because the Syrian refugee crisis is on­going and relatively new, the literature focusing                         
on the refugee context in Turkey is very sparse. With data drawn from interviews with local                               
agents of refugee settlement, observations, survey and an analysis of history, this thesis                         
endeavors to reveal the refugee experience on the ground while also highlighting its connection                           
to the larger tensions and contradictions in Turkish political history. The case in Turkey has in                               




The nation­state is a fairly new political model, dating back to the demise of empires in                               
the 19​th century. Benedict Anderson begins to codify the motives of a nation­state by first                             










The members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow­members,                           
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their                                   
communion. (Anderson, 2006: 22) 
 
The nation­state, then, is the idealized unification of an imagined community claiming                       
sovereign territory. The nation­state legitimizes its power in terms of territorialization of a shared                           
culture and history of a dominant population; the state is tied to a particular ethnic identity                               
(Basch et al. 1994: 40). Anthropologist Liisa Malkki writes that the­now­territorialized concept                       
of a nation encourages the construction of a notion of “rootedness” (Malkki, 1992: 27). Nations                             
naturalize their ties to territory through botanical metaphors, in which people are likened to                           
plants which grow in certain land. Identity is thus spatialized value, becoming immovable                         
beyond the boundaries of the nation­state (Malkki, 1992: 28). Those who cannot claim ancestral                           
ties to the territory with its shared history and language are presumed to have rootedness in other                                 
territories and are thus excluded. These claims intersect with ethnocentric notions of national                         
superiority, so outsiders in the nation­state are perceived as interior, burdensome and threatening.                         
The nation­state thus legitimizes the construction of an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’, the former                           
being a rightful member of the state, while the other constitutes a threat. Hannah Arendt points                               
out the problematic construction of ‘the other’ for the acquisition of rights by human beings in                               
their capacity as citizens of the nation­state. Since rights are guaranteed by the state, refugees                             
find themselves in a precarious position, being outside the country of their nationality due to                             
persecution; therefore forced to seek rights through the vehicle of another state in which he or                               
she is not a citizen. Arendt says that human rights becomes a questionable topic in the presence                                 
of the clear­cut boundaries within the nation­state on what makes one a rightful insider or a                               













The dysfunctional human rights in the presence of the other, as theorized by Arendt,                           
intersects with the traditional ways of engaging politically with refugee crises around the world.                           
The refugee camp is a physical representation of ‘human rights versus national rights’                         
discussion, as perhaps the most controversial strategy to host refugees. Refugees are traditionally                         
considered as a threat to the nation­state ideal to a homogenous unification of the nation.                             
Refugees bring heterogeneity into the host country as a result of their distinct rootedness in a                               
different territory, while the nation­state dreams of purity (Diken, 2004: 92). The refugee camps                           
are an attempt to maintain purity, enclosing refugees in a space characterized with extreme                           
restriction of movement. With the nation­state legitimizing the construction of the refugee as ‘the                           
outsider inside’ (Diken, 2004: 88), refugees are isolated in camps. Usually located in the                           
periphery, refugee camps are criticized for transgressing the doctrine of international human                       
rights, since they violate the internationally recognized human right to freedom of movement                         
(UDHR, Article 13).  
The UNHCR and national governments have for a long time favored the camp model                           
based on a political calculation. Gaim Kibreab describes this calculation, arguing that letting                         
refugees enjoy the rights of the locals would encourage them to stay even when the conditions in                                 









tool to ensure the temporary nature of refugee stay. Kibreab also justifies the camp model                             
presuming that integration is an idea based on the wishful thinking of resource­rich Europe                           
(Kibreab, 1989: 474). Some portray a milder approach to refugee camps, thinking that camps do                             
not always represent the worst option where the real question is “not whether or not there should                                 
be camps but to ensure that camps meet the highest possible standard and provide refugees with                               
optimal living conditions” (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 27). The Turkish example, however,                       
stands as a case that refutes such argument. With power, hot water, schools, playgrounds, and job                               
training courses provided in the camps, Turkey gained international praise for building the                         
“perfect refugee camps” (The New York Times, 2014). Irrespective of the conditions within,                         
however, 90% of refugees in Turkey have chosen self­settlement mainly in urban areas, rejecting                           
the camp option. The Turkish case, therefore, suggests that restriction of movement, isolation                         
and a passive life render camps undesirable; and there is no such thing as a perfect camp.  
The majority of scholars criticize the camp model of engaging with refugee crises.                         
Merrill Smith has referred to the refugee camp as the “warehousing” model where “refugees                           
become spectators to their own lives rather than active participants in decision­making” (Smith,                         
2004). Critics have mentioned that “the confinement of refugees to camps, are not in the interest                               
of the refugees, local populations, host governments or donor states” (Kuhlman, 2002: 7),                         
highlighting that refugees can be self­sustaining and contribute to the vitality of the host                           
country’s economy (Campbell, 2006). Using the Foucauldian idea that restriction of movement is                         
an ensured way to discipline the body (Foucault, 1979: 136), Barbara Harrell­Bond describes                         
refugee camps as places of discipline and control (Harrell­Bond, 2002: 57). As Harrell­Bond                         









camps in Turkey. Turkish soldiers and security personnel are involved in the every­day life of a                               
camp­settler, sometimes imposing violence, as Senay Ozden reports from the Kilis camp in                         
Turkey: 
Some Syrians had complaints about the presence of Turkish soldiers at the camp gates.                           
The soldiers are not allowed to walk around in the camp, but they are responsible for the                                 
security at the entrance. Besides hearing stories from Syrians residing in the camps, I                           
have also observed that soldiers sometimes treat the Syrians in a non­humanitarian                       
fashion, for example, insulting them, shouting at them and waving their guns at them.                           
Camp residents argue that the presence of armed soldiers have negative psychological                       
effects, especially for children, who have witnessed and escaped from violence in Syria.                         
(Ozden, 2013: 7)  
While approaching the refugee camp as a space of control that reifies the power of the                               
host, Barbara Harrell­Bond also points to the politics of gift­giving within these structures. The                           
passive refugee is further infantilized with the ‘giving’ nature of the camp that does not allow its                                 
settlers to be productive (Harrell­Bond, 2002: 54). The refugee is considered the constant                         
consumer of the gift ­ in this case the camp services and aid; whereas the gift giver ­ the UNHCR                                       




Reviewing the literature of refugee studies from multiple countries, this thesis finds that                         
three main issues appear to remain unresolved in host community­refugee relations: exclusion,                       
abuse and false assumptions. Similar cases around the world suggest that refugee hosts                         









host complex in an effort to capture these complex patterns in refugee­host community                         
encounters. 
Host communities have many times turned into places of discrimination, rights violation,                       
and stigma for refugees, but the current literature does not identify a widespread pattern of                             
unsuccessful host community practices. Many scholars have agreed that local integration should                       
be a key policy objective in engaging with refugee crises (​Dryden­Peterson and Hovil, 2004;                           
Ward, 2014; Morris, 2010; Smith, 2004; Bakewell, 2000; Rantac, 2014; Kuhlman, 2002;                       
Campbell, 2006). Local integration is in fact one of the three durable solutions along with                             
resettlement and repatriation suggested by the UNHCR. Host countries and the UNHCR have a                           
major role in promoting integration­oriented projects within sectors such as education,                     
employment and health. Lack of sufficient funding, however, presents great obstacles to                       
achieving success. Africa, for example, has been home to cancelled integration­promoting                     
projects as a result of financial difficulties (Ward, 2014: 87). Even mature democracies, such as                             
the UK, Australia and Sweden have not been able to avoid the trap of exclusion, abuse and false                                   
assumptions in hosting refugees (Ager and Strang, 2008; Kampmark, 2006; Eastmond, 1998).                       
The problems instigated by inefficient and unsustainable refugee policies are especially evident                       
in the case of the world’s biggest refugee hosts. The case of Yemen sets one of the greatest                                   
examples.  
The UNHCR describes the refugee context in Yemen as an “extremely delicate” case                         
(UNHCR, 2012: 23). The refugee population of Yemen is highly diverse including Somalis,                         
Iraqis and Eritreans (UNHCR, 2015c). Although the country is signatory to the 1951 Convention                           









durable solution. Tim Morris explains the refugee context in Yemen as abundant in acts of                             
hostility for a “once­welcoming host community” (Morris, 2010: 36). He points out the presence                           
of abuse, where Somalis are not allowed to enjoy the same rights as nationals in society,                               
especially at the workplace (Morris, 2010: 37). A one­month research study finds that the                           
government turns a blind eye to the abuse of refugees at the workplace in order to “maintain a                                   
supply of low­wage labor for the economy and protect higher wage jobs for Yemeni nationals”                             
(Hughes, 2002: 28). Stopping refugees at checkpoints and asking for bribes is not uncommon                           
among the Yemeni police, because refugees fear deportation and thus are unlikely to resist                           
authorities (Hughes: 2002: 35). The report also reveals that arbitrary actions of the police and                             
government officials are interlinked with the assumptions that refugees are criminals (Hughes,                       
2002: 42).  
Another example is provided by the Pakistani case. With the second largest refugee                         
population in the world, Pakistan shows a significant shift over time in locals’ behaviour towards                             
Afghan refugees. Sanaa Alimia writes that the Pakistani ­ although at first welcoming toward                           
Afghans ­ has structured a “good Muslim” and a “bad Muslim” conception, the former                           
Pakistani, and the latter Afghan (Alimia, 2014: 163). Characterizations that portray the Afghan                         
refugee as malevolent legitimates policies such as arbitrary detention and mass arrest of Afghans                           
by the police, at considerably high rates (Alimia, 2014: 163). In this case, Western perceptions                             
and portrayals of Afghans affected Pakistani public discourse. After 9/11 the Afghan was                         
suddenly considered a terrorist, a negative representation also perpetuated by the media. As a                           










Jordan, another major host of refugees as a historic home for Palestinians after the                           
creation of Israel and now Syrians since 2011 also falls prey to the international refugee host                               
complex. Jordan is in many ways similar to Turkey in its response to Syrian refugees. The                               
government and the public of Jordan also frames refugee status as legal ‘guests’ within cultural                             
notions of hospitality. Jordan has a firm stance on anti­integration policies (Ward, 2014: 87).                           
Jordan has also chosen to implement the camp model to house refugees; although Jordanian                           
camps have previously been found to negatively affect the psychological well­being of Iraqi                         
refugees (Crisp, 2009). Legal employment is not a possibility for refugees in Jordan; so that                             
refugees are compelled to find work in the informal economy where they are vulnerable to                             
workplace abuses (Arneberg, 1997:7). Literature also indicates that false assumptions shape                     7
Jordanian opinions towards refugees. Mercy Corps reports that Jordanians mistakenly assume                     
that Syrians are thriving financially in Jordan supported by international aid: 
The Syrians’ coping strategies for earning income have had the unintended consequence                       
of further provoking Jordanian resentment; the sight of Syrian refugees selling food                       
received from aid organisations, and household goods has generated the impression that                       
many Syrians in Mafraq are doing quite well – much better, in fact, than the majority of                                 
local residents (Mercy Corps, 2012: 4). 
 
Lucy Hovil finds similar experiences in the case of Uganda. Although settlement outside                         
the refugee camps is forbidden in Uganda, there are many refugees that illegally do nevertheless.                             
Excluded from local economy and society within Uganda, refugees here also suffer from similar                           
problems of abuse in the job environment. Some of the members of the local community argue                               












2007: 604­605). Refugees in Uganda are seen as a burden and, therefore, a body deserving                             
containment. Like many other scholars working in Africa (Campbell, 2006; Bakewell, 2000)                       
Hovil refutes this argument with data from ethnographic fieldwork indicating the economically                       
self­sustaining practices of refugees (Hovil, 2007). 
The construction of the other, with its negative image in the eye of the nation­state, has                               
encouraged government passivity to prevent exclusion, abuse and false assumptions towards                     
refugees. The state itself is a source of these divisive practices. With perpetuated notions of the                               
refugee as a threat to the idealized homogenous nation, the nation­states of the world, even those                               
countries with welcoming discourse, have continued to isolate refugees in camps. Camps are                         
places of absolute exclusion from society often located in the periphery. These places are built on                               
an assumption that refugees would not return if they are allowed to incorporate in city life.                               
Camps are also places that abuse the vulnerability of refugees as a result of the politics of                                 
gift­giving within these structures, a way of reiterating the power of the host. As a country that                                 
also utilizes the camp model to engage with a refugee crisis, Turkey exhibits the features of the                                 
international refugee host complex, as well. The next section discusses the presence of these                           



















This section focuses on the ways the Syrian crisis intersects with Turkish state and                           
society, drawing on fieldwork conducted in the summer of 2015. The Turks originated as                           
nomadic tribes in Central Asia. As a result of close contacts with Arabs and Persians, Turks                               
started converting to Islam in the 10​th century, but tribal independence and lack of a state concept                                 
made Turkish Islamization a gradual process. The first concept of a state was introduced with the                               
Seljuks​. Themselves once a Turkish tribe, the Seljuks founded and ruled the Great Seljuk Empire                             
which considered itself a Sunni Muslim power​. ​Defeating the Byzantines in Mazikert (or                         
Malazgirt) in 1071, they helped move Turks from Central Asia to Anatolia. Other tribes were                             
allured by this constantly expanding state; as a result, conversion to Islam gained great                           
popularity. One of the reasons of supporting Turkic conversion was the commonality Islam                         
shared with Turks’ indigenous mystic ​Goktanri beliefs. The Great Seljuk Empire and its                         8
counterpart Rum Seljuks, were shaken by the difficulties of preserving military­based rule,                       
taxing each tribe within their borders, and a growing Mongolian threat (McCarthy, 1997: 12).  
After the fall of the Seljuks, Mongols invaded Anatolia, breaking down the empire into                           
smaller pieces. Referred to as ​beyliks, these pieces of land functioned like small emirates that                             











its ruler Osman rose to power. It obtained other Turkic emirates as well as surrounding states                               
with Jewish and Christian populations, and eventually transformed into an empire referred to as                           
Devlet­i Aliyye­i Osmaniye ​(meaning the Great Country of Osman’s Dynasty), later translated                       
into English as the Ottoman Empire.  
Ottomans shared a major commonality with the Seljuks: the religion. The Ottoman                       
regime was formed around religion; state rule and policy decisions about the country’s subjects                           
were based on Islamic sharia law. Religion was central to the regulation of internal affairs; the                               10
empire established the institution of ​millet ​in order to define the citizen (Chatty, 2013: 38).                             
Though the literal translation of ​millet is ‘nation’, it refers to peoples rather than the nation­state                               
familiar to the post­19​th century world. The empire encompassed as many as 60 ethnic and                             
linguistic groups in its golden years (Karpat, 1974: 2), but the law did not recognize notions of                                 
ethnicity. Instead, the institution of ​millet ​was used, and it referred to each religious group within                               
the empire. Jews, for example, constituted a separate ​millet​, as well as Catholic Christians and                             
the Orthodox Christians (McCarthy, 1997: 128). Dawn Chatty explains the concept of ​millet and                           
how it played out among Muslims: 
A Muslim, of any ethnic background, enjoyed precisely the same rights and privileges as                           
any other Muslim. The various sects of Islam such as Shi’a, Alawi, and Yazidi had no                               
official status and were all considered being part of the Muslim millet (Chatty, 2013: 40).  
 
As central as Islam was to Ottoman rule, the Ottoman state was nevertheless known for                             
the relatively pluralistic environment it fostered toward its non­Muslim subjects in an era of                           
widespread intolerance (McCarthy, 1997: 127). Though Muslims were certainly superior in                     











belief was a matter of individual choice. The importance given to tolerance in society can be                               
considered a product of Turkish forms of Islamic practice. Turks are highly influenced by                           
Sufism, or mystical Islam. In Sufi practice, Muslims are enjoined to work on their heart as a way                                   
of getting closer to the Divine (Baldick, 2012: 44). Sufism teaches the merit of having a                               
harmonious system which promoted respect to other faiths in society (Begum and Awan, 2015:                           
23). In many ways, Sufi practice lies in contrast to other powerful branches of Islam such as                                 
Wahhabism, which developed in 18​th century Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism is highly focused on                         
outward form and practice rather than inner spiritual life. It also rejects the doctrine of Sufism,                               
and approaches it as a practice of infidels (Armstrong, 2014: 26).  11
Ottomans experienced a golden age after the acquisition of Istanbul in 1453. Istanbul was                           
of great importance for the umma because Prophet Muhammad is believed to have said that the                               
city would be conquered by Muslims. The conquest signified a success both embraced by the                             
Turks and the world of Islam in general as a validation of Muhammad’s prophecy. By this time,                                 
Ottomans were acknowledged as the leaders of the umma. The years 1516 and 1517 solidified                             
Ottomans’ leadership as they defeated the Mamluks, acquiring Egypt and laying claim to the                           
Caliphate (Deringil, 1991: 346). By defeating the Mamluks, the Ottomans also acquired Syria.                         
These years, therefore, also signify Turks’ first interaction with Syrians under the Ottoman                         
Empire. Turkish history depicts those days as peaceful, with significant respect paid to the Arabs                             
as the people who were given the holy book of Muslims, the Quran. Kathleen Reedy’s findings                               











autocratic nature of the Ottoman rule, while also pointing to the relative unity and harmony of                               
that period: 
The Ottoman era was also described by my informants as “400 years of oppression.”                           
However, these negative descriptions were meant to characterize the rulers rather than the                         
general populace, which was portrayed instead as unified and peaceful. (Reedy, 2010: 94) 
 
Beginning with a failed siege of Vienna in 1683, growing disorder in the army and rising                               
nationalism eventually precipitated the weakening of the Ottoman empire. Secession of                     
non­Muslim nations from the Ottoman Empire began with the Greeks (1829) and continued with                           
the Serbs (1877), resulting in a loss of Ottoman influence in Europe (McCarthy, 1997: 337). In a                                 
major shift from the Ottoman golden age, the country now associated non­Muslims with the                           
curse of disintegration. Eventually, a strong focus on the umma to bring back the years of                               




The heavy defeat of World War I brought and jeopardized Turkish rule even on the                             
relatively circumscribed territory remaining under their control, and brought the 600­year reign                       
of Ottoman supremacy to an end. The Ottomans were compelled to accept the conditions of a                               
punitive treaty by the Allies, the Treaty of Sevres, which mandated the dismemberment of the                             
empire. Provisions of the treaty stipulated that the control over the majority of Ottoman land                             
would be transferred to English, Greek, Armenian, Italian and French control (McCarthy, 1997:                         
374). ​The Ottoman sultan at the time, Mehmed VI (rule between 1918­1922) sent a committee to                               









militarily (McCarthy, 1997: 376). As a result, ​Kuvay­i Milliye (The National Salvation Army)                         
was established on a wave of heated Turkish nationalism. The Salvation War started by this army                               
soon gained success under its commander Mustafa Kemal, who later assumed the name Ataturk ­                             
father of the Turks. The war changed Turks’ fundamental markers of identity, as explained by                             
historian Justin McCarthy: 
Turks themselves had changed in the wars. They now identified themselves as Turks.                         
Through the Ottoman centuries the Turks had been the mainstay of a great empire. The                             
Ottoman Empire long had been called ‘Turkey’ in the West, and the sultans were indeed                             
proud of their Turkish nomadic ancestors, but the Ottomans never identified themselves                       
as a Turkish empire. They were an Islamic Empire, the last in a succession of great                               
Muslim empires that had begun with the Prophet Muhammad’s successors. (McCarthy,                     
1997: 388) 
 
Ataturk became the founder of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. A number of                           
reformations followed the establishment of the country, starting with the abolition of the                         
sultanate and caliphate; an end to the leadership status Turks had held for centuries among                             
Muslims; and finally, elimination of the phrase in the new constitution that had identified Islam                             
as the state’s religion. In its place, a new article was added, which stated that the Republic of                                   
Turkey was a laicist country. In the French­imported laicist order, religion cannot influence a                           
state’s decisions and approach to its citizenry, but the state does possess control of the acts of                                 
religious institutions in order to safeguard the political regime (Kadioglu, 2010: 489). The                         
country was thus founded on a widely diverging set of values compared to its antecedent. A form                                 
of Turkish nationalism that flared in the Empire’s final years was more dominant in government                             










The Turkish nation­state held an image of itself as freeing the dominant social group, the                             
Turks, but this was not the case for ‘the other’. As revolutions heighten tensions between various                               
social groups one’s revolution become another’s nightmare, particularly for the Kurds, and pious                         
Turks in this case. The disappointment of the Kurds began when they were not ceded the land                                 
they had been promised as a result of their participation in the War of Salvation in alliance with                                   
Turks. Kurds, long­term native inhabitants of Anatolia, were also disappointed with                     
Westernization movements happening at an extreme pace, for they strongly identified themselves                       
as pious Muslims (Gunter, 2004: 199­200). Another group that was considered problematic for                         
the state were the pious Turks who did not embrace the elimination of Islam as the state’s                                 
religion. Protests were staged by both groups which were suppressed by the state with extreme                             
measures. One such measure included the establishment of Independence Tribunals, which gave                       
enormous power to military personnel to judge and execute designated enemies of the new                           
Turkish state (Barkey and Fuller, 1997: 63). 
After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the country was ruled by Ataturk’s                           
party, the Republican People’s Party, for 23 years. A shift to a multiparty policy did not take                                 
place due to intense protests and fears of a return to sharia law. The first free elections were held                                     
in 1950, when the winner was announced as Adnan Menderes and his Democrat Party. Adnan                             
Menderes was interested in voicing the expectations of the pious. However, Menderes’ execution                         
following a coup d’etat in 1960 and a subsequent period of martial law defied a                             
long­romanticized image of a stable democratic Turkey. The influence of the army affected                         
every segment of society but laicists were allowed to possess power in the political arena                             









among the left and right, and the establishment of an armed Marxist organization by the                             
long­oppressed Kurds, the PKK, further kept Turkey from reaching its democratic ideals. The                         
strong Ottoman idealization of Turkish Islamists today is highly linked to this period. In the                             
Ottoman Empire, expression of Islamic identity could be practiced with great liberty. Under the                           
Ottomans, Islam permeated and regulated daily life. Muslims were expected to perform                       
individual religious duties such as praying five times a day and fasting during Ramadan, along                             
with communal and political responsibilities like abiding by Islamic law in public behavior and                           
governance. Since Islamic law integrates all aspects of life ­from religion to politics ­ freedom of                               
Islamic expression can be tied to an Islamic state under sharia law. 
Another reason for the idealization of the empire is its association with political and                           
economic success. The nation­state of Turkey has never been as wealthy as the Ottoman Empire.                             
For Turkish Islamists, therefore, being subjects of a religious state signified an era of political                             
and financial glory as well as complete religious freedom. The Turkish nation­state has limited                           
religious freedom for the pious and excluded them from public life. For years the Islamists were                               
not allowed to be represented at the government level; their parties were closed, and their                             
participation in Turkish democracy was continuously interrupted.  
The Islamic struggle in Turkey continued in the 1990s with perhaps the most Islamist                           
prime minister Turkey had ever seen, Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan had to step down due to army                               
pressure after only one year in office. One of his students Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the mayor at                                 
the time, was jailed because he read a poem that compared religious values with those of the                                 
army’s. After Erdogan served his jail time he founded a new Islamist party in 2001, and named it                                   









elected as the ruling party for four successive elections. The party became not only the strongest                               
Islamist party in the country, but the overall winner among all parties, Islamist and laicist. This                               
victory was historic for shifting political power in Turkey from laicists to Islamists.  
The incorporation of religion into national and political narratives has been tangible with                         
AKP rule. Islam now enjoys increased importance and visibility in state and society; the                           
manifestation of Muslim identity has reached its strongest position in the political sphere in the                             
history of Turkey. Erdogan has often made references to controversial topics such as his                           
dedication to raise a religious youth, as well as targeting laicist protesters and referring to them                               
as ‘looters’ (The Independent, 2013). He also openly supported the idea of eliminating the                           
position of the prime minister, voicing his willingness to become the first President of Turkey.                             
With his explicit intent to switch into a one­man executive model, Erdogan’s rule has become                             
increasingly autocratic. His actions have raised questions about Turkey’s return to an Ottoman                         
age in which Muslim identity brought about a privileged position. The Syrian civil war was                             
catalyzed in the same period when Turkish public suspicions over Erdogan and his party’s                           
loyalty both to the laicist regime and the nation­state model were high. From the beginning of the                                 
crisis in Syria, Erdogan’s administration practiced an open­door policy toward Syrians fleeing as                         
a result of the war. Erdogan also heavily criticized Syrian President Bashar al Assad for attacking                               
his people, and started openly supporting ­ with arms and training ­ the Free Syrian Army                               
opposition fighters (Reuters, 2015). The Turkish state became increasingly linked with Syrian                       
refugees politically, because it was now militarily involved in the crisis. Turkey’s policy was not                             










Erdogan’s opponents have linked his autocratic practices to his Islamist politics, and are                         
suspicious of the political instrumentality of his welcoming messages to ‘Sunni Muslim brothers                         
and sisters’ embodied by Syrian refugees. When asked why he had preferred involvement with                           
the crisis, Erdogan referred to the Muslim Ottoman past, saying “Because we are a country                             
established upon the remnants of the Great Country of Osman’s Dynasty. We are the grandsons                             
of Seljuks and Ottomans” (Hurriyet, 2012).  
As Erdogan continues to refer to a romanticized image of the Ottomans in the context of                               
Syrian crisis, uncertainty has remained high over the AKP’s loyalty to the 92 year­old laicist                             
nation­state model. Are the Islamists engaged in a project to resurrect the Ottoman religious state                             
model that they have long idolized? Do the Islamist government and its supporters see the Syrian                               
refugee crisis as an opportunity to generate a transformation in state tradition? The rhetoric of the                               
Turkish government seems to support this hypothesis. State have spent millions out of the                           
treasury responding to the needs of Syrian refugees. Erdogan consistently refers to Syrian                         
refugees as the ‘Muslim brother’. According to Erdogan and his party, it is their religious duty                               
inherited from the Ottoman past to make the ‘brother’ comfortable during his guesthood. In the                             
first years, Turkey even rejected the UN offer for assistance in registering Syrians because the                             
country saw the problem as related to its inner politics, which gave Turkey a reason to avoid                                 
international intervention or meddling (T24, 2013). This thesis argues, however, that the                       












Before the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, Turkey had not been a traditional                             
destination for fleeing populations but, rather, a migrant­sending country into Europe (Alimia,                       
2014: 159). The last four years have brought Turkey the biggest refugee flow in its 92 year                                 
history; it now hosts the greatest number of refugees worldwide with its Syrian population of 2.2                               







Nevertheless, researchers have indicated that better planning for an influx of refugees                       
does not necessarily come with greater experience. Countries like Jordan, Uganda, and Pakistan                         
have hosted refugees numerous times, but their refugee regimes have remained relatively weak,                         









population into their economic development strategies, and they have not come up with strong                           
integration solutions (Hovil, 2007; Ward, 2014; Alimia, 2014). Inexperienced as it is, Turkey has                           
not fully lived up to its potential, either. Though appreciation for the country’s leadership was                             
expressed by nearly every one of the Syrian refugee participants of this study, Turkish                           
engagement with the crisis has been problematic in many ways. Officials say Turkey has                           
delivered $7.6 billion in aid to Syrian refugees (Al Jazeera, 2015). The amount is clearly                             
generous for a country whose per capita GDP is less than one­quarter that of strong European                               
states like Germany and France. However, sustainability of this major financial support is                         12
highly questionable. Reports reveal that much of that amount has been spent on state­of­the­art                           
refugee camps that most of the refugees reject (Brookings Institution, 2013). It is also a matter of                                 
consideration that Turkey’s strict laws disallow permanent residence to its refugees; plans                       
oriented towards the integration of refugees has not been of priority from the outset.  
Turkish impediments to affording full refugee rights begin with the country’s relationship                       
to international refugee law. Turkey became signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention                         
relating to the Status of Refugees, which specifically dealt with the plight of European refugees                             
from World War II (UNHCR, 2010). In 1967, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees                               
designed to eliminate the geographic and temporal constraints of the 1951 Convention was put in                             
force (UNHCR, 2010). Although Turkey ratified the 1967 Protocol, it retained the geographical                         
limitation that it would only accept refugees from Europe. Turkey has integrated international                         













2014), but the geographical limitation it retained requires that someone of non­European origin                         
cannot stay permanently in Turkey. In this case, persons with legitimate refugee claim would be                             
transferred to the UNHCR for third­country resettlement.  
Syrians in Turkey who arrived as a result of the Syrian civil war are referred to as                                 
‘refugees’ in this thesis, but as persons of non­European origin these individuals are classified                           
only as ​misafirler ​(guests) or ​siginmacilar (asylees) under temporary protection in Turkish law.                         
The lack of the legal refugee designation entails a lack of rights, and therefore is extremely                               
problematic. Persons granted refugee status have internationally­recognized rights including the                   
right to cross an international border without documentation while seeking protection, right to                         
work, housing, education, public relief and assistance, fair trial, freedom of movement, and the                           
issuance of identity and travel documents (UNHCR, 2011). Syrians in Turkey are not granted                           
these rights, and often have their rights violated on a daily­basis. One of the consequences of this                                 
policy, for example, is that Syrians are compelled to seek work in the informal economy, which                               
is unregulated and in which they have no rights or protections. 
Establishing camps has been the model Turkey focused on in its refugee response. The 24                             
camps built by the Turkish government are unlike standard refugee camps around the world. The                             
Brookings Institute writes of the surprising capacity of camps: 
Camps were designed to have primary and secondary education facilities, health clinics,                       
supermarkets, playgrounds for children and laundry rooms. Refugees were given                   
refrigerators and heaters along with hot water. Some even had televisions and air                         
conditioners. (Brookings Institute, 2013) 
Turkish reception of Syrian refugees has demonstrated the government is influenced by                       
the history and religion Syrians shared with Turks in its welcoming rhetoric and open­door                           









social groups considered to be rooted somewhere else. Irrespective of the conditions within, 90%                           
of Syrian refugees in Turkey have chosen self­settlement mainly in urban areas, rejecting the                           
camp option. The Turkish case, therefore, has indicated that restriction of movement, isolation                         
and a passive life within render camps uninhabitable. The policy of building camps for refugees                             
belies an endeavor to keep Turkish cities sterile or pure. Although Syrian refugees are referred to                               
as ‘Muslim brothers and sisters’, the shared past and religion is not considered sufficient to                             
render refugees free from the ‘threat’ that is associated with such a designation.  
No matter how comfortable or enriched the camp facilities may be, camps are places of                             
control. In the Turkish model, too, the character of a refugee camp remain unchanged.                           
Movement in camps is extremely restricted: leaving and entering the camp is only possible                           
during certain hours. Keeping order inside the camp is of extreme priority; Turkish soldiers and                             
security personnel are constantly involved in the every­day life of a camp­settler. Eager refugee                           
men and women are given professional training, but even the easiest jobs in the camps are                               
outsourced and not allowed to be executed by refugees, so no chance of self­sustainment is                             
rewarded to camp­settlers (UNHCR, 2013). In Diken’s terms, the Syrian in the case of Turkey                             
has become the “outsider in the inside” (Diken, 2004: 88). The fact that Syrian refugees are                               
pacified and confined to camps ­ rather than being used as a political tool to increase the Islamist                                   
population in the country and eventually setting the stage for a comeback of an Ottoman state                               
model ­ illustrates that even the Islamists are invested in a Turkish nation­state project, rather                             
than a universalizing a Muslim state. 
The fact that Turkey is not transforming into an Ottoman state culture started to reveal                             









Syrians at the Turkish border reached millions and Turkey was caught off­guard. Turkey moved                           
from a rejection of international help to address the problem internally, towards criticism of                           
world leaders for not giving enough support and leaving Turkey alone in this                         
now­global­problem. This change in rhetoric demonstrates that Turkey had viewed the crisis as                         14
temporary, and had not calculated for a resistant or durable Assad, nor an expanding ISIS threat.                               
Turkey has not changed the geographical limitation that prevented it from accepting Syrians as                           
legally­designated refugees. In this way it has forced Syrians into an informal economy where                           




Şanlıurfa is a small city in southeastern Turkey that shares a border with Syria. Referred                             
to as ‘Urfa’ by the locals, the city has shouldered a great density of the Syrian population in                                   
Turkey due to its geographic location (Map 1). Many Syrians, in fact, have been able to walk to                                   
Urfa. The climate is very similar to bordering Syrian cities, and there are a great number of Arab                                   
speakers in the city. In the Ottoman era, Urfa was included within the larger province of Aleppo;                                 
it has historically hosted Arab­speaking populations. Urfa is not an industrial city, nor is it                             
characterized by many employment opportunities. Turkish Statistical Institute has found that the                       



















A total of 20 interviews were conducted with Syrian refugees in Urfa through an Arabic                             
interpreter. The participants of this study were of diverse backgrounds: some were Kurdish and                           
hardly spoke any Arabic, but proudly identified themselves as ‘Syrian’. Others were highly                         
educated and had completed master’s degrees, while others had completed little formal                       
schooling. Male participants were more dominant in this study because if a house included a                             
male figure, he would be informally nominated by the family to answer the interview questions ­                               
an expression of Middle Eastern gender norms and patriarchal social structure. Among the 20                           
participants, only four were women, each of whom had experienced a major shift in her                             
economic status. Karen Jacobsen theorizes this change of role as a widely­experienced                       
phenomenon: 
Crisis situations can lead to the remaking of roles and opportunities for affected                         
communities. For women, in particular, their efforts to survive mean they engage in trade                           













Being productive members of the household, for Syrian men and women in Turkey, is                           
most of the time not possible in refugee camps. Professional and commercial activity is open for                               
those who choose to self­settle. This type of settlement is risky because material goods and                             
services are not regularly provided by the state or international organizations, therefore                       
self­settled refugees face different challenges than those living in camps. High rents, host                         
community hostility, and a competitive job market are challenges peculiar to the city­life of a                             
self­settled urban refugee. On the other hand, the city is often perceived as the only way to ‘be                                   
alive’ again by urban refugee dwellers. Camps are seen as stagnant, delaying life in the hopes of                                 
repatriation. Self­settlement, on the other hand, is seen as a way of engaging oneself with                             
everyday concerns like work and continuing education; acting instead of waiting. Self­settlement                       
thus represents an opportunity and a risk. 45 year­old Abdul Hakeem Aziz has found kinship                             16
networks as the determining factor in the urban settlement. “There are two types of people at the                                 
Syrian border of Turkey. Those who have relatives and those who don’t. The ones who don’t, go                                 
to camps,” he said, revealing that camps are places that refugees settle in by mandate or lack of                                   





























Syrian refugees in Turkey do not perceive settlement in camps as oriented towards                         
leading a normal life, but rather a response to the desperation of some refugees who are not                                 
fortunate enough to have local or family connections, or the financial means to settle in urban                               
areas. Camp structures are places where only the extremely vulnerable go because of the urgency                             
of their particular situation. Syrian refugees are thus internally divided between those who are                           
circumscribed in camps, and those who are not. 
Fieldwork conducted in Şanlıurfa during the summer of 2015 has demonstrated that                       
Turkey exhibits many features of what this thesis identifies as the ​international refugee host                           
complex​. Around the world, refugee and host community relations exhibit a common set of                           
patterns informed by social, economic and political structures. Three critical issues are                       













The Turkish government has not openly discouraged Syrian refugees from settling in                       
urban areas. It has, however, failed to enforce a working urban policy for the two million                               
self­settled refugees. This study has found high levels of disappointment among Syrians                       
grounded in the lack of a strong legal structure regulating the lives they pursue in the city. One of                                     
the main problems of not having a clear national policy is selective obscurity for some refugees                               
but not others. For example, this thesis has found incredibly vague policies surrounding the                           
taxation system for refugees. Out of the 20 Syrians interviewed in Urfa, a full half (10) were                                 
business owners. Seven of these stated that the state had not asked them to pay taxes, and that                                   
they had not come across any legal or bureaucratic difficulties while starting their respective                           
businesses. On the other hand, three Syrian business owners claimed that they were paying taxes,                             
and the burden was too heavy to shoulder. An essential difference between the business owners                             
that paid taxes from those that did not was the touristic location of the enterprises. It can be                                   
inferred that the government only taxes the visible, either to avoid negative reactions from                           
surrounding Turkish business owners, or it assumes that refugees running shops in downtown                         
areas are financially privileged and capable of paying taxes. With no Turkish speakers employed,                           
and no Turkish signboards in sight, Syrian businesses in commercial areas operate for a                           









with their established Turkish counterparts. 34 year­old participant Ibrahim Ahmad Hamadi who                       
ran a dessert shop in downtown Urfa was frustrated with inconsistent taxation policies for                           
Syrians: 
We heard that Syrians would not pay taxes before we opened this shop but then we saw                                 
that we were responsible for going through each procedure a Turkish citizen does…                         
When we came here from Syria, we transitioned from a faster death into a slower one.                               
Only the air we breath is free, and even for that we are paying a heavy price with our                                     
worsening psychology. 
 
This selective obscurity, exemplified by the taxation conundrum, causes other problems                     
for Syrian employees, including time abuse and labor exploitation. During the fieldwork the                         
research team observed a tendency of some local businessmen to request from their Syrian                           
employees more work hours with much less pay. Since Syrian refugees are not granted work                             
permits in Turkey, they enter the workforce as part of the informal economy, without legal or                               
labor protections. Senay Ozden writes that this abuse sometimes happens at refugee camps, in                           
front of the eyes of government officials: 
Many Syrians state that farm and factory owners exploit Syrian workers due to their                           
vulnerable situation. They also claim that employers prefer to employ Syrians over local                         
workers since they are cheaper. This view has credibility as one of the factory owners I                               
interviewed said: “Thanks to Bashar al Assad, we now have cheap labor.” Not only are                             
the Turkish authorities not taking any precautions against the exploitation of refugee                       
labor, they are actually indirectly encouraging it. Even though initially Islahiye camp                       
residents were not allowed to leave the camp, once the red pepper season approached,                           
they were allowed to stay outside the camp from 9am to 5pm. Early in the morning, there                                 
are hundreds if not thousands of Syrians standing in front of the camp, waiting to be                               
picked to go to work in farms and factories (Ozden, 2013: 8). 
 
The data this research collected in the summer of 2015 were in line with what Ozden                               
found in her 2013 study. The most commonly given answer to the question ‘What are the                               
difficulties of city­life?’ was job­related. Eight participants said that the biggest challenge they                         









example was provided by Fatima Adeen, a 32 year­old Syrian woman with 7 kids. Her economic                               
status sharply changed when she became expected to provide for her family as a result of the                                 
war. She worked next to a wood­fired kiln for 12 hours a day, including weekends. Her salary                                 
was not hourly but rather 25 TL per day (approximately 8 USD). “We endure this so that our                                   17
children won’t have anything lacking” she stated. Another example was given by 21 year­old                           
Ayman Majid. He said his brother had once worked for a week but found that the 25 TL daily                                     
wage promised by the employer turned out to be 25 TL for the entire week. Many of the Syrian                                     
participants in this study verified significant wage inequalities in the Turkish labor environment,                         
some adding that even if Syrians accepted lower salaries, there were also businesses which                           
would not hire any Syrian, simply due to discrimination.  
Conceptions of Syrian identity in Turkey have thus mutated from one of ‘Muslim                         
sister/brother’ into a pathologizing ‘disorder’ especially in cities with an overwhelming number                       
of Syrians. During the fieldwork, as the researcher team took notes of ethnographic observations,                           
a Turkish businessman was noted as saying the number of drug dealers, prostitutes and                           
trouble­makers in general increased since the arrival of Syrians. His personal experience was                         
found to be legitimating his frustration. He said at first he opened his house to a group of                                   
Syrians, but they acted disrespectfully by contaminating his house and secretly using it for                           
engagement in illegal activities. While the corroboration of this experience transgresses the                       
purpose of this thesis, it should be considered that local tradesmen complaining about the                           













of these based their stories not on personal experience but on what they heard from others                               
(Ozden, 2013: 11).  
Counterintuitively, a similar pattern of variable wages was being implemented by certain                       
Syrian businessmen. Restaurant owner Jamal Qodrat Fahim had four Turkish men, along with                         
many other Syrians, working for his business. When he was asked if the salaries of Turkish and                                 
Syrian employees were the same, he said he would pay 35 TL a day for his Turkish employees                                   
and 25 TL for Syrians. He justified this unequal distribution by saying “This is the land of the                                   
Turks; their share should be bigger.” Thus, establishing rootedness in a certain territory was                           
given equal importance by Turks and Syrians, and used as a way to legitimize superiority for the                                 
dominant class, and exclusion for the other.  
The abuse of Syrian refugees was not solely encountered in the workplace. Three                         
participants in this study indicated that pricing varied for food stamps provided by the                           
government at the point of refugee registration. Dessert shop owner Ibrahim Ahmad Hamadi                         
said: “They give you a 90 lira shopping card but as soon as the merchant sees that you hold that                                       




Although all of the participants were well aware of the rights that refugee status entailed,                             
and although all accepted that there was hostility from some segments of the Turkish public,                             









phrase of “We do empathize with the Turks,” while evaluating the tense environment between                           
locals and Syrians. The majority also pointed out that they felt their overall experience in Turkey                               
as positive. Their evaluation ­ almost always ­ included a comparison of Turkey with Arabic                             
states, especially Jordan and Lebanon, both of which they found extremely disappointing in                         
responding to the crisis. The number of false assumptions shaping the local opinion on Syrian                             
identity and behavior, however, was extremely high. Every single Syrian refugee participant of                         
this study pointed out to a shift in attitude towards them and the public’s departure from facts to                                   
assumptions. 45 year­old Abdul Hakeem Aziz explained the reaction to Syrians switched from a                           
brotherly approach into a condescending one:  
Before, when the number of Syrians in Turkey was relatively lower, Turks would look at                             
us in a merciful way and help more. In general the Turkish public is an eager­to­help                               
public. However, there is more tension compared to past. 
 
Another element commonly found in the statements of Syrians self­settling in the urban                         
areas of Urfa was the lack of access to relief operations and provisions, primarily as a result of                                   
false assumptions surrounding the status of various Syrian refugees. Two Syrian participants                       
stated that they were interested in receiving aid and completed aid applications at Danish,                           
German, Japanese and American organizations within the city. 50 year­old Safa Said expressed                         
that he was rejected by the organizations because his area of settlement was among the                             
neighborhoods listed as ‘rich’. He was frustrated to be residing in an area where all residents                               
were assumed to be wealthy, adding that his home was provided by a relative. Abdul Hakeem                               
Aziz also stated that he was not considered eligible for aid because he wasn’t living in                               









similar experience; he described what he saw as the superficiality of aid policies by underlining                             
that he needed help but could not get any because he runs a shop:  
 
Whenever there is aid to be delivered some Turks come, say ‘You have a shop,’ and then                                 
they leave. They never ask if there is a family behind me that I need to support. What                                   
should I do, then, beg in the streets? 
 
He also said relief organizations had a strange bureaucratic procedure that is not                         
proper­behaviour for handling an emergency situation:  
There were two relief organizations, one was Danish and the other was a Turkish one                             
called Support to Life. You go there, fill in an application and then they say “We are                                 
going to send this to Istanbul and then if they approve, we are going to help you.” 
 
This superficiality and miscoordination was expressed by another Syrian participant who                     
experienced the converse side of what other participants came across. He said he was constantly                             
offered aid although he is a wealthy person. “They deliver aid without researching well,” he said.                               
“Somehow aid reaches the rich but it won’t reach the poor.” 
It was also not rare to overhear assumptions over the Syrian’s assumed ‘abuse’ of the                             
support provided to them. Many Turks think that Syrians are here to stay, further manipulating                             
the government’s resources and avoiding a self­sustaining life. However, 18 out of 20 Syrians                           
spoken to in this project mentioned at least once how much they wanted to go home. They asked                                   
for prayers, and answered the question ‘What is your expectation from international or national                           












Exclusion ­ either by ​verbal harassment and incivility, or discrimination from society ­ ​is                           
the third major tendency of the international host community complex; and it is also found in the                                 
case of Turkey. The increasing association of Syrians with various forms of bad behaviour has                             
led to scapegoating that affects how Turkish locals perceive and interact with Syrians. Though                           
most of the Syrian participants of this study said they had only heard about such scapegoating, as                                 
the crisis turns into a protracted one the situation becomes more alarming. The camp strategy                             
embraced by the government and the lack of a clear policy to integrate or regularize the life of                                   
urban refugees is indicative of the fact that even though the majority of Syrians are Sunni                               
Muslim (as are Turks), the Syrian refugee community is not being used as a political tool by the                                   
dominant Turkish Islamist political party. All of the refugees participating into this study stated                           
that they observed maltreatment against Syrians, even not personally experienced. Yet only three                         
out of 20 Syrian participants said they experienced verbal abuse personally, such as being                           
accused of ruining Turkey. One of the female participants, Asma Shaikh, who works as a teacher                               
at the Syrian school said that the way Syrian women wear their hijab made them vulnerable                               
targets of exclusionary behaviour: 
When I’m on my way to work, people understand that I’m Syrian by the way I put on my                                     
headscarf. Sometimes when I pass by, I see them clap their hands, shouting “Syrians, go                             
back home.” Sometimes they throw stones into the classroom. Kids get scared, trying to                           
hide because they think it is a bomb.  
 
It is also noteworthy that some Syrian participants associated acts of societal exclusion                         









26 year­old dentist Jalaluddin Malik stated that “Alawites and Kurds want to get rid of Syrians,”                               
implying that exclusion was not coming from Turks but rather from other minority groups who                             
were active in the Syrian conflict. 22 year­old former student Hisham Abdullah thought that                           
Kurds were responsible for Syrian exclusion from society, basing his argument on                       
misinformation. He said he heard that the authorities of the Kurdish party ​Halklarin Demokratik                           
Partisi (People's’ Democratic Party), or the HDP, said they would ‘kick out’ the Syrians once                             
they come to power. While this was a statement voiced publicly, it was actually from the leader                                 
of ​Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party), or the CHP, not a representative of the                             
Kurdish party.  18
In general, the Turkish approach to the Syrian refugee crisis started with Turkish                         
society’s positive approaches, but has become more negative with time. Turkey was lauded early                           
on for creating ideal refugee camps. Refugee participants of this study, however, have not found                             
Turkey to be an ideal host. A comparison of Turkey with European countries was commonplace                             
in the rhetoric of participants. Almost all Syrian interviewees talked about Europe as the ideal                             
destination. Ibrahim Ahmad Hamadi’s remarks explained why any refugee in Turkey would risk                         
their life on a boat while trying to reach Europe: 
When we speak to our friends who have gone to Europe we hear that they are picked up                                   
at the airport in the most welcoming way, they are given monthly wages and a shelter.                               
You never get to see people begging there! Here, when a Syrian is about to rent a place                                   
[property owners] double the amount and then ask for commission, deposit… 
 













As a Syrian youngster I would love to go to the US or France for my education. But                                   
because we are Syrian they see us as pro­ISIS there. You can’t go to the US even if you                                     
wanted to… You’re a terrorist! France, Germany, Denmark… these are all nice places                         
but you can only go there illegally. If you want to go the trafficker ask 10,000 EUR and                                   
you risk your life. You put your life at risk trying to go there by water. Hard stuff! If the                                       
traffickers wanted less money like 3,000 EUR maybe I’d work here for one year and save                               
up. I would risk my life to save my future. But when they ask for 10 thousand… I would                                     
need to work here for years and years to save that much. 
 
Just as Ibrahim Ahmad Hamadi and Hisham Abdullah were, almost all refugee                       
participants of this study were knowledgeable of what it meant to be a refugee, and the rights                                 
coming along with it. Turkey takes pride in its first class refugee camps, but the quality of                                 
refugee camps in the country becomes an irrelevant topic in the refugee question, since an                             
overwhelming number of Syrian refugees live in urban and semi­urban areas. The rising number                           
of Syrians taking the dangerous maritime way from Turkey to Europe ­ 600,000 people in 2015 ­                                 
is a sufficient marker that Turkey’s hospitality and notions of guesthood are not sufficiently                           




In order to conceptualize the public opinion on Syrian refugees, an online survey was                           
conducted with Turkish citizens via SurveyMonkey in the summer of 2015. 164 responses were                           
collected. The questions in the matrix­question­survey included the age and sex of the                         
participant, their location, concerns about having Syrians in Turkey, security issues with the                         









laicism. The majority of the participants were comprised of young professionals; more than 40%                           
were between 26­32 years old.  
71.9% of those who took the survey said that they either disagreed or strongly disagreed                             
with the statement ‘I think the civil war in Syria will end soon,’ revealing the likelihood that                                 
Syrians will stay in Turkey for a long time. In fact, the majority believed Syrians will not leave                                   
even if the conditions improved in Syria, 63% of survey participants said that they either                             
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement ‘I think Syrians in Turkey will return their                             
country when the war is over’. However, 18 out of 20 Syrians interviewed mentioned at least                               
once how much they wanted to go home. They asked for prayers, and answered the question                               
‘What is your expectation from the international or national organizations’ with “Help us go                           
back home”.  
Apart from the presumption that Syrians will stay longer and not leave when the war is                               
over, most of the responses collected indicate to differentiating thoughts Turks have about                         
Syrians. Data illustrates that the number of the government’s open­door policy supporters are                         
almost as many as those who are not in favor of the policy. The responses reveal that 69 people                                     
taking the survey agreed or strongly agreed with the statement ‘I find the open­door policy                             
adopted by the government towards Syrian refugees right.’ The number of those who disagreed                           
or strongly disagreed with the statement, on the other hand, was 70. The difficulty of inferring a                                 
dominant opinion of Turks on Syrians was also demonstrated by other questions in the survey.                             
The statement that was included in order to measure whether the majority of Turks felt that                               










One of the purposes of the survey was investigating whether political affiliation                       
influenced Turks’ patterns of thought on the Syrian issue. The answers of chosen statements                           
were, therefore, analyzed according to the party the participants voted for in the national                           
elections held in June 2015. Two parties were taken into consideration in this matter, the AKP as                                 
the representative party of the country’s right­wingers and the CHP as the representative of                           
left­wingers. The survey found a positive relation between political affiliation and public’s                       
thoughts on Syrians. 64% of the AKP supporters that took the survey said that they were not                                 
concerned with the presence of refugees; whereas the ratio was the opposite for the supporters of                               
the laicist party. As many as 86% of CHP voters agreed or strongly agreed with the statement ‘I                                   
am concerned about having Syrian refugees in Turkey.’  
Political affiliation also played a role in the safety concerns of Turks as a result of hosting                                 
Syrian refugees. 60% of CHP participants of the survey said they felt insecure at the presence of                                 
Syrian refugees; whereas the AKP supporters did not agree with the sentiment. 64% of the AKP                               
voters said they disagreed with the statement ‘I feel insecure at the presence of Syrian refugees.’                               












AKP and CHP supporters also had a disagreement over the inclusion of Syrians in the                             
efforts of developing the Turkish economy. 44% of the AKP supporters said they either agreed                             
or strongly agreed with the statement ‘I believe that Syrian refugees will contribute to the                             
Turkish economy in the long term’, whereas the ratio was only 10% for CHP supporters. One of                                 
the few points where the two polarized groups agreed on was the refugee camps. The majority of                                 











The Islamist and laicist in Turkey have traditionally opposed each other in the social and                             
political arena as an expression of ideology and identity. Responses collected in the survey                           
demonstrate that political affiliation shapes public opinion towards Turkey’s Syrian refugees. A                       
particularly interesting result of the survey is illustrating that supporters of AKP and CHP agree                             
on the use of refugee camps as an appropriate policy to deal with Syrian refugees in Turkey.                                 
Although Islamists did not feel insecure in the presence of Syrians, or believe that the open­door                               













This study does not claim to be a complete representation of the thoughts and opinions of                               
all Turks or Syrians in Turkey. The crisis is an on­going one at the time of the writing of this                                       
thesis. Turkey can therefore be the stage of a major change than what this study argues, or                                 
transgress the expectations of the argument presented here. The interview process and the survey                           
was conducted with many challenges emerging, the biggest of which was the dependence of an                             
interpreter during the interviews. Out of 20 Syrian refugee participants to the study only one                             
spoke English and was able to communicate directly with the researcher. Most of the time, the                               
location was not eligible to take notes, so the interpreter had to consecutively interpret the                             
conversations where the main objective was transferring the main message rather than going too                           
much into detail. This field study also had Syrians with Kurdish origins as participants. Two of                               
the Kurdish Syrian participants needed one of their relatives to interpret for the Arabic­Turkish                           
interpreter, turning the research environment into a multilingual one. As a notarized translator,                         
the researcher translated the interviews from Turkish to English once the tape­recording                       
procedure was complete, which further increased the potential meanings lost each time a                         










Throughout the fieldwork, one of the biggest challenges that limited the data collection                         
was maintaining privacy. The locals, especially the ones who helped the researcher team of two                             
spot the locations of self­settled Syrian refugees did not want to leave during the interview                             
procedure. The local interest to the study was very high, a lot of times it was impossible to have                                     
an environment free from a local who wanted to hear what Syrians were going to say and                                 
contribute to the research with their idea. Though locals were only present when the interviewees                             
had granted them permission, it can be presumed that lack of complete privacy had an effect on                                 
the participant’s answers, perhaps forcing the participant to self­censor.  
One of the objectives of the study was contacting with refugees who previously lived in a                               
refugee camp in Turkey in order to hear more about the conditions of the camps. However, the                                 
research team did not find anyone who lived in camps before. Three of the participants did say                                 
they never thought of living in the camps because they heard ‘bad things about them’ and asked                                 
not to share more information. This can be interpreted as a safety issue for them. 
The data this study has collected is also based on an online survey created, the title being                                 
Turkiye’nin Suriyeli Misafirleri Hakkinda Anket Calismasi (Survey on Turkey’s Syrian Guests).                     
The choice behind conducting an online survey via SurveyMonkey was related to an effort to                             
avoid the negative effects of unfamiliarity in face to face surveys while asking sensitive                           
questions like ‘What political party did you vote for in the last (June 2015) elections?’ However,                               
the number of survey takers that answered the political affiliation question was also low; out of                               
the 164 people that took the survey only 112 of them answered the election question that would                                 










Conducting an online survey only allowed the researcher to reach the people within her                           
circle, most of whom voted for the same party, came from similar backgrounds and                           
similarly­opinionated families, with similar lifestyles that are not quite representative of all                       































With the Middle East region a growing generator of instability and violence, relatively                         
stabilized countries in the region have become major refugee hosts in the world. As a result of                                 
the civil war in Syria that broke out in 2011 Lebanon hosts over a million Syrian refugees today                                   
(UNHCR, 2015d); almost one in every four people in its borders is a Syrian refugee. Jordan                               
hosts approximately 630.000 (UNHCR, 2015d), and almost one out of every ten people there, is                             
a Syrian refugee. In Turkey, the number of Syrian refugees hosted has hit 2.2 million (Al                               
Jazeera, 2015a). It is a matter of consideration that the overwhelming number of refugees                           
arriving in these countries since the beginning of the war in 2011 is a disadvantage in devising                                 
efficient refugee response plans. As this thesis focuses on Turkey, it suggests that the $7.6 billion                               
Turkey has spent for refugee crisis management, most of which has been used for building high                               
capacity refugee camps, could have been directed to plans that regulate the urban life of a                               
refugee. 90% of Syrian refugees have preferred self­settlement in urban and semi­urban areas,                         
some for having a job and education, and some for finding refugee camps honor­staining. This                             
study has found that the burden the refugee shoulders as a result of self­settlement in urban areas                                 
is extremely heavy due to the Turkish government’s vague policies and increasing local abuse. ​It                             
has been found that, for example, there is a major taxation conundrum among refugees and                             
locals. ​Seven of the Syrian business owners taking part in the semi­structured interviews that                           
took place in ​Şanlıurfa stated that they were not asked to pay taxes by the state, and that they had                                       









hand, three Syrian business owners said that they were paying taxes as much as Turks did,                               
adding to their frustration for not being protected with affirmative action. The fieldwork has                           
found that life was even more difficult for Syrians that did not own their own businesses. There                                 
is a growing informal economy based on the capital the Syrians provide; the daily payment of an                                 
illegal Syrian worker has converged at 25 TL. The price is lower than what Turks earn. With                                 19
small allowances, Syrians try to cope with property owners that double the price of their home as                                 
soon as they find out their tenant will be Syrian, or merchants that increase the price when they                                   
find out that the customer holds government­provided food stamps, as the participants of the                           
fieldwork have voiced. As these examples demonstrate, Turkish policy on the Syrian refugees                         20
becomes vague as soon as there is a departure from the camp environment. The Prime Ministry                               
Disaster and Emergency Management Authority’s (AFAD) comprehensive fieldwork in 2013                   
has shown the failure of the government to provide refugees in urban areas with basic services.                               
The study indicates to a major health disparity between refugees in camp and non­camp settings.                             
The study suggests that as much as 90% of the male and 94% of the female refugees in camp                                     
settings have used medical facilities (AFAD, 2013). However, only 60% of the male and 58% of                               
the female population that live in non­camp settings have accessed them (AFAD, 2013). 
The fieldwork conducted in the summer of 2015 has explored an increasing level of                           
hopelessness among Syrian refugees in southeastern Turkey, a type of hopelessness of not                         
having a future neither in Syria due to the on­going war, nor in Turkey due to a lack of refugee                                       
designation, and the rights entailed in it. The appreciation level for Turkey’s actions was high                             











counterparts in Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt. Their frustration, however, is inevitable with the                         
knowledge of what it means to be a recognized refugee in Europe. This knowledge separates                             
them from the Turkish community, members of whom voiced many concerns over ‘the guest                           
being improper’ as a result of increasing level of subjective discrepancies.  
The government of Turkey has welcomed refugees, referring to them as the ‘Muslim                         
brother’. The welcoming rhetoric adopted towards the Syrian refugees by the Turkish                       
government, especially by president Erdogan, has its roots in Islam. It got its strength, however,                             
from a long tradition of Muslim isolation from the political and social life in Turkey. Turks’ rule                                 
saw a fast transformation from the Ottoman model of a Sunni Muslim state tradition into the                               
establishment of Republic of Turkey, a laicist nation­state. The new state tradition and the values                             
it was based on a Westernization program imposed top­down by the elite. It is difficult to address                                 
the top­down­imposition of democracy in Turkey as a flawed model, especially with the                         
notorious examples set by the negative effects of communal movements in search of democracy                           
in the Middle East. One thing is for sure, however, that the elite imposed a set of Westernizing                                   
revolutions with coercion. Such a policy has been the determining factor in the creation of two                               
polarized groups in Turkish society, at the one end stands the Islamist, at the other the laicist.                                 
Segregating policies towards the Islamist was a reality, so was the protest of the Islamist with                               
pure positive depiction of the Ottoman era in mind. 2002 represented a major change in this                               
matter; now the romanticized image of the Ottoman era has been carried into the political sphere                               
with the rule of the AKP. This meant an exposure of the Islamist and Ottoman ideals to all layers                                     
of society, including the other polarized end of the laicist. Ever­since the Islamists came to                             









onto political power represented a comeback of the old Sunni Muslim state tradition, and the                             
sharia law. This thesis argues that the Syrian crisis, and the government’s response to it should                               
be regarded as a major tool to measure such hypothesis, the concern of the ‘comeback’. Turkey’s                               
Islamist government has welcomed refugees but shown unwillingness to regulate their lives in                         
the city as a way of promoting the life in camps. The results of the online survey conducted                                   
among Turks have demonstrated that the government’s policy was in line with public opinion.                           
The majority of the online survey takers revealed their support of the camp model of housing the                                 
refugees, although refugees were acknowledged as long­term settlers. 
With fuzzy policies, and a failure to address to increasing local hostility, there is growing                             
evidence that Turkey cannot be a good host, at least from the lens of international laws. There                                 
has been a considerable number of refugees trying to depart from Turkey on dangerous maritime                             
journeys. ​UNHCR statistics illustrate that within the first 10 months of 2015, 600,000 people                           
have taken the smuggler route across the Aegean, and approximately 200 of those perished                           
(​UNHCR, 2015b)​. As a result of the death of many in the smuggler boats, many Syrian refugees                                 
in Turkey protested. Al Jazeera has reported that many Syrians with imaginings of rights in                             
Europe tried taking a bus to Bulgaria, waiting for days in the terminal, but the ministry of interior                                   
did not issue a travel grant, and took them back to camps (Al Jazeera, 2015b). With such                                 
attempts, Syrians have revealed the deficiencies of Turkish management but Turks have not                         
changed their policy. The geographic limitation that disallows Turkey from recognizing persons                       
of non­European origin as refugees, for example, remains in the Refugee Protocol. Failing to                           
reach the modern democratic ideals of the 21​st century in its refugee response, Turkey also                             









and see Turks as proud successors of the Ottomans, but such rhetoric has not made its way into                                   
practice in the case of Syrians.  
The Ottoman way of internalizing the newcomer has not been the case in Turkey.                           
Ottomans defined the citizen based on their religion; and the Muslim ​millet ​had superiority.                           
However, the religion of Syrians has certainly not given them superior status in Turkey to the                               
contrary. The Turkish government’s practice has been more oriented towards the ideals of a                           
nation­state. According to Benedict Anderson the nation­state is based on the territorialization of                         
an imagined community with shared language and history. ​The nation­state legitimizes the                       
construction of an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’, the former being a member of the dominant class,                               
and the latter being the other. ​In the case of Turkey, the Syrian has become the outsider the                                   
nation­state excludes; in Diken’s terms, ‘the outsider inside’ ​(Diken, 2004: 88)​.  
The ​d​e facto ​strategy of the government in its response to the refugee crisis has been                               
building refugee camps, a product of the nation­state in search of homogeneity. ​While                         
perpetuating the power structure between the gift­giver and receiver ​(Harrell­Bond, 2002: 54)​,                       
r​efugee camps are detrimental for the mental well­being of the residents. The AFAD agency has                             
revealed that the refugees living in Turkish camps report to be more in need of psychological                               
treatment services compared to urban refugees. As 50% of the male and 55% of the female                               
refugee population who live in camps said that they would need psychological support, the rate                             
was 46% for male and 49% for female refugees living in urban areas (AFAD, 2013). 
The current refugee situation in Turkey is multifaceted. On one hand, the refugee has                           
become living evidence of the effects of a history of polarization in Turkey. On the other, the                                 









nationalism rather than a worldwide umma. Such a change did not bring with it a transformation                               
to modern laws, especially in the case of international refugee laws. The interviews with and                             
actions of Syrians have demonstrated that Syrians are losing hope. Although this hopelessness is                           
shown to the government and the public with increasing number of deaths in smuggler boats                             
neither the officials nor Turkish society has taken action. The government has still not regulated                             
the urban life of a refugee. The public has not stopped situating the Syrian issue within notions of                                   
guesthood, and it has kept on legitimizing the practice of putting refugees in camps. Turks have                               







































































































































































































































































































































































































­ The government must act as soon as possible to prevent the practice of begging among                             
Syrians. 
­ I think the civil war in Syria will end soon. 
­ I think Syrians in Turkey will return their country when the war is over. 
­ Syrians should go back to their country immediately. 
 
­ I believe the Syrian refugees in Turkey will start contributing to the Turkish economy 
soon 
 
­ I believe that Syrian refugees will contribute to the Turkish economy in the long­term. 
 
­ I think Syrian refugees are detrimental to Turkey's laicism. 
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­ Which party did you vote for in the last elections? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
